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Abstract
The United States’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic was suboptimal. One problem in it was the politicization of the public health
response. One aspect of that politicization was aggressive political
intervention in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
efforts to provide guidance and help pandemic response. The concern was
strong enough that four previous CDC Directors, in an unusual step,
published an op-ed calling out political intervention in the CDC. This
article proposes two changes to strengthen the CDC’s institutional
independence: codifying the CDC’s role in preventing diseases and
reducing harms in a statute, and restructuring the agency to be led by a
multi-member board appointed for long times and with removal
protections (along the lines of the Board of the Federal Reserve System).
These changes can send a strong message that expert advice in public
health should be science-based and less, rather than more, political. It
can also protect CDC’s long-standing independence, while preserving
some political control.
Experts generally regard the United States’ response to the COVID19 pandemic as unsatisfactory. 2 One aspect of the problem–though by no
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means all of it–was the strong politicization of the response, including
politicization of federal public health guidelines. 3 Apparent political
influence on guidance offered by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has undermined the agency’s ability to provide data
and recommendations that government leaders, private organizations, and
the general public can trust to guide their actions. In a glaring example,
after President Trump criticized previous CDC guidelines on the topic, the
CDC released a document on schools reopening that experts say
understated the risk of opening schools, clearly influenced by the White
House. 4 Even more concerning, the Trump Administration’s intervened –
or at least attempted to intervene–in the CDC’s journal, the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, traditionally a source of objective scientific
information. 5 The Trump administration has also acted to reduce the
CDC’s ability to collect coronavirus data; this raises real concerns about
the ability of the CDC to perform its role of providing expert guidance
and helping to contain the pandemic. 6 This situation creates concerns that
the White House will try to interfere in CDC’s traditional role in
recommending vaccines, or marginalize its committees in the process of
overseeing COVID-19 vaccines in development.
The intensity of the COVID-19 crisis justifies reconsidering the
governance of the CDC. I recommend that Congress act in two ways to
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Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on COVID-19, P OLITICO, Sept. 11, 2020, available at:
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Meddled in C.D.C.’s “Holiest of the Holy” Health Reports, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 12, 2020, available at,
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increase CDC’s ability to act independently to promote public health.
First, Congress should codify CDC’s functions in a statute that clearly
gives it the responsibility to provide guidance, training and support during
outbreaks, and second, Congress should reorganize the CDC as an
independent agency and replace its director–appointed and removable at
the President’s discretion—with a board akin to Federal Reserve System’s
Board of Governors. At this point, CDC does not have direct, specialized
statutory authority for its primary roles, and the CDC director is appointed
by the President with no oversight and removable at will. This leaves the
CDC with little formal defenses against administration efforts to interfere
in its efforts to reduce diseases and harms, and can both undermine trust
(necessary for CDC guidance to have an impact) and directly undermine
public health.
The tension between politics and expertise is far from new. In public
health policy, it is unavoidable. Public health policy is inherently political
because it involves decisions about allocating resources and broad value
judgments in which public health must be weighed against other policy
concerns. Yet, public health policy determinations must be based on
accurate and up-to-date data and evidence-based guidelines. Politicization
of the data and public health recommendations that guide management of
health threats undermines the effectiveness and accountability of the
public health groups.
The relationship between assuring political responsiveness and
providing good expertise is complex, and a full discussion of it is beyond
the scope of this article. 7 But one major concern in it is that politics may
lead to distortion of scientific information; intervention in an agency
whose main role is to advise, train, and provide information brings that
concern to the forefront. 8 This makes a very strong case for limiting direct
political intervention in the daily functioning (as opposed to the broader
framework) of an agency whose main role is providing surveillance,
expert advice and guidance.

7. For several in-depth discussions, see Wendy E. Wagner, A Place of Agency Expertise:
Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 C OLUM. L. R EV. 2019, 2026-31 (2015);
Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 EMORY L. J. 423, 430, 430 n.27 (2009); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 33-56 (2009); Thomas O. McGarity, Our
Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding
Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. R EV.
897, 921-31 (2004).
8. Wagner, supra note 7, at 2022-23; McGarity, supra note 7, at 897-900.
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I. T HE CDC’S ROLE GENERALLY
There is not a primary authorizing statute that created the CDC or
assigned it roles, unlike, for example, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Specific statutes delegate specific duties to CDC, and the Public
Health Service Act is regarded as creating authority for the federal
government to act on infectious diseases generally, but the CDC was
created by executive action, not statute. 9 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention started as a war-time agency in 1942, as the Office of
Malaria Control in War Areas. 10 It was established in Atlanta, GA because
“the southeastern location represented the central point of endemic
malaria in the United States at that time.” 11 After the war ended, officials
in the United States Public Health Service supported the creation of a
permanent expert organization to assist states in disease control by
providing science, training, and epidemiologic investigation. 12 The CDC,
therefore, was designed from the start to provide expert knowledge and
support in responding to infectious diseases threats. It was designed as
“several centers that would make available to the state health departments
certain highly specialized competencies which few states could afford to
maintain on their own staffs. Each center would concentrate on a broad
segment of public health.” 13 The CDC’s scope has since expanded to
cover a large variety of communicable and non-communicable disease
threats, but its basic role has not changed. 14
The CDC’s main role is developing knowledge and providing expert
guidance and assistance to others–at the local, state, federal and
international level. 15 This is reflected in the CDC’s description of its “core
capabilities,” including “develop [ing] and deploy[ing] world-class data
and analytics,” “maintain[ing] state-of-the-art laboratory capacity,”
providing “elite public health expertise,” and “quickly respond[ing] to
outbreaks at their source.” 16

9. ELIZABETH W. ETHERIDGE, S ENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE C ENTERS FOR
DISEASE C ONTROL 16-17 (1st ed. 1992).
10. William H. Foege, Centers for Disease Control, 2 J. P UB. HEALTH P OL’ Y 8, 8 (1981).
11. Id. In a personal communication, Dr. Alan Hinman clarified that the Southern location was
“ also because there were many military training bases in the southeast. Although the army could
handle malaria on-base, there was need to control malaria around the bases.” (Comments on a
previous draft, sent via email, August 19, 2020).
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. Id. at 9.
14. ETHERIDGE, supra note 9, at 341-43.
15. Id.
16. CDC Strategic Framework, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/strategic-framework/index.html (last visited July 8, 2010).
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Congress has occasionally given the CDC specific authorities. 17 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Surgeon General have
also delegated the organization specific powers. Some of these powers are
regulatory. It is through delegation, for example, that the CDC is in charge
of issuing federal quarantine orders. 18 CDC initially had regulatory
authority over clinical laboratories, but this authority has since been
reassigned to the FDA, with the CDC continuing to be involved primarily
in an advisory and support capacity. 19 The CDC also manages the
Vaccines for Children program in a regulatory role, a federal program
designed to provide vaccines at no cost to children who may have access
barriers. 20
Although it also has regulatory responsibilities, the bulk of the
CDC’s work, as described above, is still as an expert body which collects,
analyzes and disseminates data, provides support and advice to states and
local bodies (and now, international bodies and other countries too21 ).
This was its role in most of the major health problems in the United States,
including the opioid crisis, lead paint, disease outbreaks, and now during
the COVID-19 pandemic. 22

17. E.g., Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act
(PAHPAIA), Pub. L. No. 116-22, § 319(c)-(d) (3)(b) (2019) (giving the CDC consulting authority in
regional health care emergency preparedness).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-265 provided the initial power to the Secretary of Health. See Wendy E.
Parmet & Michael Sinha, COVID-19–The Law and the Limits of Quarantine, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED.
(2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2004211; James J. Misrahi, The CDC’s
Communicable Disease Regulations, Striking the Balance Between Public Health and Individual
Rights, 67 EMORY L. J. 463 (2018).
19. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), U.S. F OOD & DRUGS ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/ivd-regulatory-assistance/clinical-laboratory-improv ement-am endments-clia
(current as of Feb. 25, 2020).
20. Jason Schwartz & James Colgrove, The Vaccines for Children Program at 25–Access,
Affordability, and Sustainability. 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2277 (2020).
21. Joel M. Montgomery et al., Ten Years of Global Disease Detection and Counting: Program
Accomplishments and Lessons Learned in Building Global Health Security, 19 B IOMED C ENT. P UB.
HEALTH 510 (2019), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-019-67692.
22. For example, CDC provides guidance and advice on opioids and lead paint, and advised,
trained, and assisted in outbreak response in the United States and elsewhere. Joseph V. Pergolizzi,
Melanie Rosenblatt & Jo Ann LeQuang, Three Years Down the Road: The Aftermath of the CDC
Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, 26 ADVANCES IN T HERAPY 1235 (2019)
(opioids); Adrienne S. Ettinger, Monica L. Leonard & Jacquelyn Mason, CDC’s Lead Poisoning
Prevention Program: A Long-Standing Responsibility and Commitment to Protect Children from
Lead Exposure, 25 J. P UB. HEALTH MGMT. & P RAC. s5 (2019) (lead paint); Gabrielle O’Meara et. al.,
Ensuring a Competent Public Health Responder Workforce: The CDC Experience, 17 J. EMERGENCY
MGMT. 199 (2019) (advice, training, and assistance). See also ETHERIDGE, supra note 9, at 341-43
(general summary and details).
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II. T HE CDC’S ROLE IN T HE US RESPONSE T O T HE CORONAVIRUS
PANDEMIC, A SHORT PRIMER
In January 2020, in response to reports of a pneumonia outbreak in
Wuhan, China caused by a novel coronavirus strain, federal officials
initiated containment measures to prevent the epidemic from reaching the
US. CDC instituted public health entry screening at major international
airports in the US on January 17, 23 but there is no evidence that airport
screening resulted in detection of any reported cases during the
containment phase. 24 Two Americans who had recently returned from
Wuhan tested positive for the novel coronavirus on January 21 and 24
after arriving at hospitals with symptoms; they were treated in isolation
rooms. 25 CDC reported these cases to the public, along with
recommendations about measures state and local governments, clinicians,
and the general public should take in response. 26 On January 29, the State
Department repatriated hundreds of Americans from Wuhan. 27 Under the
first federal quarantine order issued in more than 50 years, 28 CDC ordered

23. Public Health Screening to Begin at 3 U.S. Airports for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (“2019nCoV”), C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0117-coronavirus-screening.html; First Travel-Related
Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND
P REVENTION (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronaviru s travel-case.html (describing expansion of public health entry screening to additional airports); Lori
Aratani & Miriam Berger, Here Are the 20 U.S. Airports Where Health Officials Are Screening for
Coronavirus, W ASH. P OST, Jan. 30, 2020 (CDC announcing expansion of public health entry
screening to cover a total of 20 airports on January 28).
24. Out of 256 individuals across 34 jurisdictions for whom CDC staff recommended testing
in January 2020—at a time when testing was available solely through CDC—six were identified
through airport screening. CDC did not specify whether any of the six identified through airport
screening were among the 11 who tested positive in January. See Kristina L. Bajema et al., Persons
Evaluated for 2019 Novel Coronavirus—United States, January 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
W EEKLY R EP . 166 (2020).
25. First Travel-Related Case, supra note 23; Second Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Detected in United States, C ENTER F OR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan. 24,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0124-second-travel-coronavirus.html.
26. First Travel-Related Case, supra note 23; Second Travel-Related Case, supra note 25.
27. HHS and CDC Receive Flight Carrying Repatriated US Citizens, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE
C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0129repatriated-US-citizens.html#:~:text=This%20morning%2C%20the%20Department%
20of,Air%20Reserve%20Base%20in%20California.
28. CDC is authorized to issue orders isolating individuals reasonably believed to be infect ed
or quarantining individuals reasonably believed to have been exposed to any of the diseases listed in
a standing Executive Order. The list includes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which officials
determined was sufficient to encompass infection with the novel coronavirus strain. Transcript for
CDC Media Telebriefing: Update on 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), C ENTERS FOR DISEASE
C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0131-2019-
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the repatriated individuals to be held in government-provided facilities at
March Air Reserve Base in California while being monitored for
symptoms and tested for infection during a 14-day incubation period. 29
None tested positive. 30 On January 30, CDC reported the first instance of
human-to-human transmission occurring within the US—between one of
the first travel-acquired cases and a household contact. 31
As part of its role in pandemic response, the CDC had to create test
kits. Possibly due to time pressure to get tests out, the CDC sent tests
where one of the components was contaminated in a way that made the
results invalid to “33 states and 70 labs in 66 countries.” 32 As a
consequence, data from these states was unreliable. 33 It took the CDC
several days to identify the problem and remove the contaminated
component, and after discovery of the problem in February, it took until
March 15, 2020 to receive a revised Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
from the Food and Drug Administration for a test without the problematic
component. 34
By late February, the CDC realized that there were case of COVID19 in individuals who had not travelled to China/had contact with a
traveler. 35 Reports from China, Germany, and elsewhere indicated that
asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals were capable of
transmitting infection to others, rendering guidance focused on people
novel-coronavirus.html (confirming that the last time a federal quarantine order—as distinct from an
isolation order—was issued was in the 1960s for a smallpox evaluation).
29. CDC Issues Federal Quarantine Order to Repatriated U.S. Citizens at March Air Reserve
31, 2020),
Base, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan.
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0131-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.
30. Bill Chappell, 195 Americans Released from Coronavirus Quarantine at Southern
California Air Base, NAT’ L P UB. R ADIO (Feb. 11, 2020, 3:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2020/02/11/804915231/195-americans-are-released-from-co ronavirus-qu arantine-atcalifornia-air-base.
31. CDC Confirms Person-to-Person Spread of the New Coronavirus in the United States,
C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirus-spread.html.
32. DEP ’ T OF HEALTH & HUMAN S ERVICES, S UMMARY OF THE F INDINGS OF THE IMMEDIATE
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL C OUNSEL’ S INVESTIGATION R EGARDING CDC’ S P RODUCTION OF COVID19 T EST KITS (June 19, 2020), https://context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/
documents/5610e9fa-86d7-4bd3-8b7a-f8d f10c6 fc9e/note/7331 ef79-a672-4d2d-9 efff8ce39c2e462.#page=1; David Willman, CDC Coronavirus Test Kits Were Likely Contaminated,
Federal Review Confirms, W ASH. P OST, June 20, 2020.
33. Willman, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See CDC Confirms Possible Instance of Community Spread of COVID-19 in U.S.,
C ENTERS
FOR
DISEASE
C ONTROL
AND
P REVENTION
(Feb.
26,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226-Covid-19-spread.html; CDC Announces Additional
COVID-19 Presumptive Positive Cases, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION (Feb. 28,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0228-additional-COVID-19-cases.html.
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who were symptomatic inadequate to achieve containment. 36 Several
countries ramped up widespread testing and contact tracing to contain or
suppress the spread of asymptomatic infection. But in the US, these efforts
were slow to start and were quickly outpaced by widespread community
transmission. This was exacerbated by the fact that the FDA initially
restricted testing to labs that had obtained special approval. 37 Early CDC
guidelines directed health care providers to refer patients for testing only
if they had a history of travel to China, exposure to a person known to
have been infected, or were hospitalized for pneumonia or acute
respiratory distress. 38 Testing supplies were in short supply. 39 Lack of
access to testing left people unsure about whether they posed a risk of
transmitting the virus to others, and left state and local leaders ill equipped
to deploy targeted disease control strategies. The CDC guidelines
coincided with contradictory statements from the President questioning
the advisability of widespread testing. 40

36. Matt Apuzzo, Selam Gebrekidan, & David D. Kirkpatrick, How the World Missed COVID19’s Silent Spread, N.Y. T IMES, June 27, 2020.
37. Lab Advisory: Reminder: COVID-19 Diagnostic Testing, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL
AND P REVENTION (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dls/locs/2020/reminder_covid19_diagnostic_testing.html (“ Any laboratory that is not designated by CDC as a qualified laboratory
and is implementing a COVID-19 diagnostic test other than the CDC EUA assay must contact the
FDA to obtain an EUA before any COVID-19 diagnostic testing may be performed in their
facilities.”).
38. Update and Interim Guidance on Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),
C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION: CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK–00427 (Feb. 1,
2020), https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/HAN00427.asp (“ Clinicians should ask: Does the person have
fever or symptoms of lower respiratory infection, such as cough or shortness of breath? AND Has the
patient traveled to mainland China within 14 days of symptom onset? OR Has the patient had close
contact1 with a person confirmed with 2019-nCoV infection?”); Update and Interim Guidance on
Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND
P REVENTION:
CDC
HEALTH
ALERT
NETWORK–00428
(Feb.
28,
2020),
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2020/HAN00428.asp (expanding eligibility for testing to those with
“ [n]o identified source of exposure” only in the presence of “ [f]ever with severe acute lower
respiratory illness (e.g., pneumonia, ARDS (acute respiratory distress syndrome) requiring
hospitalization and without an alternative explanatory diagnosis (e.g., influenza).”); Update and
Interim Guidance on Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), C ENTERS FOR DISEASE
C ONTROL AND P REVENTION: CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK–00429 (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2020/HAN00429.asp (Abandoning restrictive guidelines by
indicating that “ [c]linicians should use their judgment to determine if a patient has signs and
symptoms compatible with COVID-19 and whether the patient should be tested.”).
39. Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to COVID19, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronaviruspandemic.html.
40. Matt Wilstein, Reporters Hammer Trump on Coronavirus Testing: Are you Being Selfish,
Daily Beast (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/reporters-hammer-trump-o n coronavirus-testing-are-you-being-selfish.
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On March 12, the CDC put up a document with the title:
“Implementation of Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local
COVID-19 Transmission.” 41 Described as “a framework for actions
which local and state health departments can recommend in their
community to both prepare for and mitigate community transmission of
COVID-19,” the document recommended that “actions should be guided
by the local characteristics of disease transmission, demographics, and
public health and healthcare system capacity.” 42 The framework
recommended that “[a]ll individuals should limit community movement
and adapt to disruptions in routine activities (e.g., school and/or work
closures) according to guidance from local officials” in places with
“substantial” community transmission. 43 Substantial community
transmission was defined as occurring when “healthcare staffing [is]
significantly impacted [and there are] multiple cases within communal
settings like healthcare facilities, schools, mass gatherings etc.,”44 The
CDC framework additionally recommended that in periods of substantial
community transmission, organizations should “cancel community and
faith-based gatherings of any size.” 45
The White House issued competing guidance on March 16, 2020.
The “15 Days to Stop the Spread” guidelines recommended that certain
groups—people who feel ill, people who test positive for coronavirus and
their family members, and people who are older or who have serious
underlying health conditions that put them at increased risk—should stay
at home. It also recommended that everyone should “avoid social
gatherings in groups of more than 10 people,” “eating or drinking at bars,
restaurants, and food courts,” and “discretionary travel, shopping trips,
and social visits.” 46 With respect to closures, the guidelines noted that
“[g]overnors in states with evidence of community transmission should
close schools in affected and surrounding areas” and “[i]n states with
evidence of community transmission, bars, restaurants, food courts, gyms,

41. C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION
S TRATEGIES FOR C OMMUNITIES (Mar. 12, 2020) (on file with author).
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id.
46. 15 Days to Slow the Spread, W HITEHOUSE. GOV (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread. 15 Days to Slow the Spread was later
revised and replaced with 30 Days to Slow the Spread, The President’s Coronavirus Guidelines for
America, W HITEHOUSE. GOV (Mar. 30, 2020).

116

C ONLAW NOW

[12:107

and other indoor and outdoor venues where groups of people congregate
should be closed.” 47
In the latter half of March, state and local governments rapidly issued
orders that exceeded the recommendations of the most well-vetted prepandemic plans and federal guidelines for COVID-19. The same day the
White House issued its 15 Days Guidance, seven local health officers in
the San Francisco Bay Area followed the examples set by China and
Italy and issued mandatory shelter-in-place orders and prohibitions on all
nonessential onsite business operations. 48 The Bay Area orders opened the
flood gates. Within two weeks, the majority of state governors had
followed their lead. 49
CDC’s guidance did not go as far. For large community events and
mass gatherings CDC recommended cancellation of “gatherings of more
than 10 people for organizations that serve higher-risk populations.”50
Notably, even as nearly every state issued mandatory orders restricting the
operation of commercial businesses, CDC’s only guidance for “keeping
commercial establishments safe” recommended disinfection of surfaces,
steps to stagger customer flow and frequent hand washing, 51 and its
website suggested that businesses “[c]onsider establishing policies and
practices for social distancing . . . if recommended by state and local
health authorities.” 52 CDC also issued a series of guidance documents for
specific localities and states, including the cities of Santa Clara, Seattle,
and New Rochelle, and the states of Florida and Massachusetts. The CDC
47.
48.

I5 Days to Slow, supra note 46, at 2.
See, e.g., C ITY AND C OUNTY OF S.F. DEP ’ T OF P UB. HEALTH, ORDER OF THE HEALTH
OFFICER NO. C19–07 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://sfgsa.org/sites/default/files/Document/OrderC 1 9 07ShelterinPlace.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY48-MFZW]; Julia Prodis Sulek, Meet the Doctor Who
Ordered the Bay Area’s Coronavirus Lockdown, the First in the U.S., MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 29,
2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/29/she-shut-down-the-bay-area-to-slow-the-dead l y coronavirus-none-of-us-really-believed-we-would-do-it [https://perma.cc/K4DH-QYG8] (describing
the events that led seven local jurisdictions to simultaneously issue shelter-in-place orders).
49. Jennifer Kates et al., Stay-at-home Orders to Fight COVID-19 in the United States: A
Scattershot Approach, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronaviruspolicy-watch/stay- at-home-orders-to-fight-covid19 [https://perma.cc/WXK4-BCPU]
50. Considerations for Events and Gatherings, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND
P REVENTION: C OMMUNITY, W ORK & S CHOOL, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/large-events/mass-gatherings-ready-for-covid -19.html (last updated July 7, 2020).
51. What Every American and Community Can Do Now to Decrease the Spread of the
Coronavirus, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/workplace-school-and-home-guid ance.pd f (last visited April 4,
2020).
52. Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), C ENTERS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL AND P REVENTION: C OMMUNITY,
W ORK & S CHOOL https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business response.html (last updated May 6, 2020).
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guidance for Santa Clara recommended “laser focused” and less
restrictive interventions that were inconsistent with the county-wide
shelter-in-place order the Santa Clara Health Officer had issued a day
earlier. 53 CDC guidance for other locations similarly recommended less
stringent measures than state and local authorities had already adopted.
By the end of March, when the White House replaced its 15 Days
guidance with “30 Days to Slow the Spread,” the majority of states had
gone significantly further than the White House or CDC guidance
recommended.
In April, CDC reversed its earlier guidance directing that masks
should only be worn by health workers and people who are sick, and this
change was described as an about face in the media. 54 Several state and
local governments also issued mandatory face mask requirements,
physical distancing requirements, and capacity or density limits to reduce
the risk of transmission for essential workers and customers at essential
businesses. 55 Like social distancing, mask mandates for the general public
were based on the need to treat everyone as if they could be silently
spreading the virus to others. The early guidance against masks for the
general public would be widely reported as having been motivated by the
need to conserve scarce supplies for health workers. But the mask
guidance flip-flop was also driven by evolving understanding of the risk
of asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic spread. 56
On April 16, the White House released its Guidelines for Opening
Up America Again. The White House plan recommended, but did not
require, a phased approach to resuming social gatherings and reopening
schools and the types of businesses that the previous White House
guidelines had recommended, but not required, should be closed
53. CDC’s Recommendations for 30 Day Mitigation Strategies for Santa Clara County,
FOR
DISEASE
C ONTROL
AND
P REVENTION,
California,
C ENTERS
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Santa-Clara_Community_Mitigation.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
54. Matthew Keegan, Do Masks Work to Fight Coronavirus? East Asia Says: “Yes,” U.S.
NEWS & W ORLD R EP ., Apr. 7, 2020; Considerations for Wearing Masks, C ENTERS FOR DISEASE
C ONTROL AND P REVENTION: YOUR HEALTH, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2020) (later guidance).
55. Sophia Ankel & Connor Perret, More than 20 US States are now Requiring Residents to
Wear Face Masks when in Public, B USINESS INSIDER, July 11, 2020, available at
https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-the-17-states-requiring-people-to-wear-m asks-public2020-6; NASHP, Chart: Each State’s Covid-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask
Requirements, (Oct. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritize-health-for-all.
56. Nina Bai, Still Confused About Masks? Here’s the Science Behind How Face Masks
Prevent
Coronavirus,
U. C AL. S.F.: NEWS &
MEDIA (June
26,
2020),
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2020/06/417906/still-confused-about-masks-heres-science-behind-ho wface-masks-prevent.
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(including bars, restaurants, gyms, and other venues where groups of
people gather). 57 Although the guidelines were reasonably cautious, they
were met with widespread skepticism, particularly among Democratic
governors, who announced they would develop their own plans for
reopening. Ultimately, most states reopened gyms, bars, restaurants, and
other higher-risk settings like movie theaters and bowling alleys in spite
of the White House criteria in the guidance not being met. Some
jurisdictions imposed requirements for the general public to wear face
masks.
Also in April, in preparation for overseeing the vaccine development,
the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP) created a
workgroup to oversee the development of COVID-19 vaccines, and that
work group reported to the full committee during its June 2020 meeting. 58
ACIP traditionally monitors vaccines in development once they reach an
advanced stage: for routine vaccines, it usually creates a workgroup
before licensure. 59
In June, cases surged in many places that had been largely spared
during the spring. 60 State and local governments began what may
ultimately prove to be the first of multiple phases of re-tightening. CDC
continued to issue guidelines for various community settings, including
businesses and schools. However, these guidelines were increasingly
viewed as politicized, and media reports indicated that CDC statements
were affected by non-CDC personnel. 61 For example, was evidence a
57. Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Announces Guidelines for Opening Up America
Again,
W HITEHOUSE. GOV
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-announces-guidelines-opening-ameri ca; Guidelines: Opening
Up American Again, W HITEHOUSE. GOV (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
openingamerica.
58. Grace M. Lee, Beth P. Bell & Jose R. Romero, The Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices and Its Role in the Pandemic Vaccine Response, JAMA, July 22, 2020,
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2768852.
59. Jane Clare Smith, The Structure, Role, and Procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 28 VACCINE A68, A72, A74-5 (2010).
60. Noah Higgins-Dunn, U.S. Coronavirus Cases Surge By More than 45,000 in One Day,
Total Surpasses 2.5 Million, CNBC: HEALTH AND S CIENCE (June 27, 2020).
61. Tal Axelrod, CDC Director Says Guidance Shelved by White House Was “in Draft Form,”
T HE HILL (May 9, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/496937-cdc-director-says guidance-shelved-by-white-house-was-in-draft-form; READ: The Full Draft CDC Guidelines on
Reopening From Stay-at-Home Orders, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/13/politics/cdc-draftreopening-guidelines/index.html (last updated May 14, 2020); Samantha Putterman, Joe Biden
Correct that Trump Administration Delayed, Scaled Back CDC Reopening Guidelines, P OLITIFACT
(July 6, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jul/06/joe-biden/joe-biden-correct trump-administration-delayed-sca/; Lena H. Sun & Josh Dawsey, The CDC Is Walking a Tightrope
as the Coronavirus Pandemic Meets Politics, P HILA. INQUIRER, July 10, 2020; Jill Colvin & Mike
Stobbe, Trump, Pence Remarks at Odds with Medical Consensus, C OLUMBIAN (July 10, 2020),
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detailed CDC report on reopening business was “shelved” by the Trump
administration. 62 The agency has, apparently, been ordered to “rewrite
guidance to reopen schools to ‘make it easier and cost less’.” 63 These events
prompted four former CDC directors—Tom Frieden, Jeffrey Koplan,
David Satcher, and Richard Besser—to pen an op-ed. They asserted that
“over a period of more than 15 years, spanning Republican and
Democratic administrations alike,” they could not recall a single time
“when political pressure led to a change in the interpretation of scientific
evidence.” 64
Revelations in August and September increased concerns about
political intervention in CDC. In August 2020, the CDC revised its testing
guidance to say that people without COVID-19 symptoms do not
“necessarily need a test. 65 “ In response, the Infectious Diseases Society of
America published a statement calling for immediate reversal of the
changes and criticizing it. 66
In late August 25, 2020, Amy Maxmen, a science writer with the
prestigious peer reviewed journal Nature, wrote an article on data
challenges in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. 67
The article said:
Some speculate that because the pandemic is politically charged, data
describing the situation are guarded closely by officials in the administration of President Donald Trump. Researchers say that investigation
published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports have been thorough, but are published online long after they can
influence outcomes. . . . Samuel Groseclose, a public-health specialist
who retired from CDC in 2018, suggests that the reports are undergoing
an unusual amount of review within the agency, and perhaps its parent
agency, the US Department for Health and Human Services (HHS). 68

https://www.columbian.com/news/2020/jul/10/trump-pence-remarks-at-odds-with-medicalconsensus.
62. Putterman, supra note 61.
63. Sun & Dawsey, supra note 61.
64. Frieden, et al., supra note 4.
65. Will Feuer, CDC Quietly Revises Coronavirus Guidance to Downplay Importance of
Testing Asymptomatic People. CNBC (August 26, 2020) available at: https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/08/26/cdc-quietly-revises-coronavirus-guidance-to-downplay -importance-o f-testing-forasymptomatic-people.html.
66. IDSA/HIVMA Statement on Changes to CDC Guidance, available at
https://www.idsociety.org/news—publications-new/articles/2020/idsahivma-statement-on-changesto-cdc-guidance/.
67. Maxmen, supra note 5.
68. Id.
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More explicit coverage of political pressure on the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR)–which have traditionally been
authored by career scientists and seen as a scientific source, and has
traditionally not been subject to political interference – was published in
the second week of September. Journalist Dan Diamond from Politico
documented efforts both from the politically appointed CDC Director, Dr.
Robert Redfield and from the Department of Health and Human Services’
spokesman, Michael Caputo, to influence the content of the reports.69 The
article described direct efforts to intervene in the content of the report,
some of which had an effect. 70
Political interference in CDC guidance and efforts was not the main
cause of the pandemic or of the failure to contain it. However, while some
of the problems in CDC’s response (like the testing contamination) were
internal, political intervention harmed CDC by undermining trust in it. 71
The intervention also raises real concerns that the administration will try
to undermine the traditionally independent process of making
recommendations related to COVID-19 vaccines. 72 The concern that the
administration will directly intervene in CDC’s professional decisions is
not a hypothetical concern: there is strong evidence that influence by the
administration had a role in the FDA’s choice to give an emergency use
authorization (EUA) to hydroxychloroquine. 73 The revelation of political
intervention with the MMWR in CDC – a scientific source – also shows
that this is already done, and is a real concern. 74 There is every reason to
worry that there will be efforts to influence the vaccine
recommendations. 75

69. Diamond, supra note 5.
70. Id.
71. Adam Cancryn, Hundreds of Health Groups Petition Against Trump, P OLITICO: HEALTH
C ARE (July 7, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/07/hundreds-health-groups-petitiontrump-350154; CDC’s Politicization “Extremely Dangerous” for Americans, Says Its Former Head,
PBS (July 14, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/cdcs-politicization-extremely-dangerou s for-americans-says-its-former-head.
72. Lee, Bell & Romero, supra note 55.
73. Sarah Owermohle, FDA Ends Emergency Use of Hydroxychloroquine for Coronavirus,
P OLITICO: HEALTH C ARE (June 15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/fda-endsemergency-use-of-hydroxychloroquin e-319872; Laurie McGinley & Josh Dawsey, Touting
Criticized Study, White House Presses FDA to Authorize Hydroxychloroquine–Again, W ASH. P OST,
July 10, 2020.
74. Diamond, supra note 5.
75. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Paul A. Offit, Opinion, Could Trump Turn a Vaccine into a
Campaign Stunt?, N.Y. T IMES, June 8, 2020.
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III. CDC’S CURRENT GOVERNANCE ST RUCT URE AND CONST IT UT IONAL
CONST RAINT S ON CHANGING IT
The Constitution addresses the appointment of federal officers in
Article II, Section 2, referred to as “the Appointments Clause.” 76 Under
the Appointment Clause, “Officers of the United States” should be
nominated by the President, “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,”
but Congress has the authority to vest the appointment of inferior officers
(which the clause does not define) “in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” 77 In practice, large segments of
the administrative state are not appointed under the Appointment Clause,
but serve as civil servants appointed through a merit system. 78
The line between those who must be appointed via the appointment
clause and those who are not is blurry. The distinction is focused on the
concept of “officers of the United States,” defined by the Supreme Court
as those who “wield ‘significant authority.’” 79 There is conflicting
jurisprudence on who, exactly, is an officer under that definition. 80 At
least one author suggests that large swaths of our civil service are
unconstitutionally appointed under the Clause, because of her analysis of
the original meaning of the term “officer.” 81 However, the dominant view
in the legal community, drawing on non-originalist meanings–accepts that
a substantial portion of the public service do not have to be considered
“officers” for the purpose of the Appointment Clause. 82

76. Michael Devitt, Coronavirus Remains Front and Center at June ACIP Meeting, AM.
ACAD. F AM. P HYSICIANS: NEWS, July 1, 2020, https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-thepublic/20200701acipjunemtg.html.
77. U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
78. Nina L. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delay in the Agencies,
64 DUKE L. J. 1571, 1582-86 (2015).
79. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 S TAN. L. R EV. 443, 447
(2018).
80. Id. at 447-49.
81. Id. at 449-55.
82. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73,
76-89 (2007); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 C OLUM. L. R EV. 613, 659 (2020). A detailed
discussion of the scope of the appointment clause is more than is needed for this article, given its
relatively simple proposal, but besides the sources above, extensive discussions of the Appointment
Clause, in the wake of Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), can be found at the following sources:
Symposium on Lucia v. SEC, YALE J. ON R EG.: NOTICE & C OMMENT (2018),
https://www.yalejreg.com/topic/symposium-on-lucia-v-sec; Samuel A, Shwartz, Lucia v. SEC: The
Ambiguity of the Appointments Clause Continues, Sending Tremors Throughout the Administrative
State, 14 J. B US. & T ECH. L. PROXY 1 (2019); Michael A. Sabino, “Liberty Requires Accountability”:
The Appointments Clause, Lucia v. SEC, and the Next Constitutional Controversy, 11 W M. & MARY
B US. L. R EV. 173 (2019-2020).
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The other piece of the appointment puzzle is whether and when
Congress can limit the President’s ability to remove officers.
Traditionally, the person who appointed an officer can remove her or him;
in the case of principal officers, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, that means the President. 83 There is an
extensive jurisprudence on removal, but the most recent decision on the
matter, the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law v. CFPB, appears to
have both simplified and restricted Congress’ ability to limit removal. 84
In Seila Law, the Court made a strong statement in support of unlimited
Presidential removal power, but acknowledged two historical exceptions
are still valid – “one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield
substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited
duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.” 85 Seila Law
certainly deserves in-depth, thoughtful treatment of its own, and raises
questions for positions that do not fit the exceptions but have limits on
removal. But since this paper proposes removal limits for multi-member
boards with powers that are primarily non-executive removal, Seila Law’s
main holding, which is about single-head agencies and expressly allows
an exception for multi-member boards, is not a barrier. 86
At present, the CDC Director is appointed by the President without
a requirement for the advice and consent of the Senate, and can be
removed at will. 87 Administrative structures of appointment vary
dramatically from position to position, but this specific arrangement offers
almost no protection from the political executive. Further, other factors –
like the agency’s physical distance from other power centers in
Washington DC and a culture of not playing politics – make the agency
especially vulnerable in the face of an administration determined to

83. Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VIRGINIA L. R EV. 1779, 1783-84
(2006).
84. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 19-7, slip op. (U.S. June 29,
2020).
85. Id. at 16.
86. The decision is very recent. For an article already addressing it, see Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Decisions of 1789 Were Non-Unitary: Removal by Judiciary and the Imaginary
Unitary Executive (Part II), F ORDHAM L. S CH. LEGAL S TUD. R ES. P APER S ERIES (May 10, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3597496.
87. See, e.g., David Rosner & Linda P. Fried, Traditions, Transitions and Transfats: New
Directions for Public Health, 125 P UB. HEALTH R EP . 3, 3-4 (2010); see also C OMM. ON HOMELAND
S ECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED S TATES S ENATE, P OLICY AND S UPPORTING
P OSITIONS, at 68 (Comm. Print 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK2016/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2016.pdf (CDC director is a non-career appointment, and no term
limits exist).
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interfere in its work. 88 The fact that the agency does not have a specific
authorizing statute setting out its roles also means that the executive has
more discretion to redefine or take over its role.
The solution is not for CDC to become more political. Given the
CDC’s special role–serving as a centralized platform for disease and
injury surveillance and providing advice and guidance for how other
agencies and actors respond to health threats –there are real benefits to its
detachment from direct political struggles. An agency whose primary role
is advising, providing guidance, and training should be more isolated from
politics than agencies whose role is primarily regulatory. The best solution
is restructuring the CDC to provide layers of protection between the
agency and the administration, while maintaining some direct political
accountability.
IV. T HE FEDERAL RESERVE

AS A MODEL

Completely detaching CDC leadership structure from politics is both
undesirable (since public health is inherently political) and likely not
constitutionally permissible. It is also not necessary. A model that
provides some protection from political influence while maintaining a
political role in guiding the agency offers a good balance, and a statute
clearly codifying the CDC’s role would protect its ability to provide
expert guidance, give that guidance more prominence, and bring into
sharp relief any effort by White House tries to bypass CDC by issuing its
own guidance. Institutionalizing independence also signals to people
inside the CDC and outside that independent guidance is, in fact, what is
legally expected.
Congress should enact a statute doing two things. First, it should
clearly define the CDC’s role. The definition should state that the CDC is
charged with providing expertise, guidance, and support (through
training, research, directly assigning personnel and other ways) in
preventing communicable and non-communicable diseases and injuries in
the United States and abroad. The CDC is authorized to create and analyze
expert knowledge, provide guidance, and provide assistant and support to
local, state, federal and global actors dealing with diseases and enact rules
and create guidance documents to fill these roles. The CDC already has
authority to enact rules related to directly delegated regulatory duties, but
such a statute could and should include an express delegation of
88. Nicholas Florko, The CDC Has Always Been an Apolitical Island. That’s Left it
Defenseless Against Trump, STAT (July 13, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/13/cdcapolitical-island-defenseless.
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regulatory authority within the CDC’s sphere of responsibility. Second,
Congress should restructure the CDC’s leadership along the lines of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed). This model
has several benefits. First, it has a long history of acceptance, and is on
solid ground constitutionally. Second, it provides real guarantees of
independence while preserving a role for the President and the Senate in
structuring the leadership.
One problem with moving to a Board is that the CDC’s role in
outbreaks means that it has to deal with emergencies practically every
year. A board–where decision making may be slower than a single
individual–may find such response more challenging. However, a
potential alternative of making the Director only removable for cause
appears foreclosed by Selia Law, while a multi-member board can
constitutionally have removal protections. A potential solution is to
provide for limited emergency decision making authority by the Chairman
of the Board, potentially with the advice of the vice-chairs. While the
President can appoint the Chair and remove the Chair from that position,
the President cannot completely remove the person, and limits on
authority—for example, a time limit—can prevent abuse.
In 1935, for a variety of reasons, Congress passed the Banking Act,
which, among other things, changed the method of appointment and
removal of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 89 The
Fed is the central banking system of the United States, whose role is “to
provide financial services to depository institutions and the U.S.
government, supervise and regulate certain types of financial institutions,
set monetary policy, and maintain the stability of the financial system.”90
One change was distancing the Fed from politics by “removing the
Treasury Secretary and the comptroller of the currency from the directors’
table” and lengthening the terms the governors serve to fourteen years. 91
The focus of this article is not on whether this structure helped the
Fed achieve its purposes or whether this is good public policy in the
context of the Federal Reserve System. 92 The structure of the federal
89. P ETER C ONTI -B ROWN, T HE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL R ESERVE 29-30
(2017); R OGER LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA’ S B ANK 266 (2015).
90. What is the Fed?, F ED. R ES. B ANK S.F.: EDUC., https://www.frbsf.org/education/teacherresources/what-is-the-fed (last visited August 17, 2020).
91. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 89, at 266.
92. See, e.g., Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan
for a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. R EV. 371, 381-90 (2000-2001);
David Min, Federalizing Bank Governance, 51 LOY. U. C HI . L. J. 833 (2019-2020); C ONTI -B ROWN,
supra note 89, at 105-373; Andrew Atkins, The AIG Bailout: Constraining the Fed’s Discretion, 14
N.C. B ANKING INST. 335, 350-60 (2010).
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reserve board is, to my knowledge, the most rigorous set of institutional
protections of independence that can survive constitutional muster and the
CDC would benefit from a similar structure.
The board consists of seven members appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate for fourteen years in staggered
terms. 93 Members are only removable by the President for cause. 94 The
Banking Act sets out some criteria for appointment, stating that, of the
Governors,
[N]ot more than one [. . .] shall be selected from any one Federal Reserve district, the President shall have due regard to a fair representation
of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and
geographical divisions of the country. . . . the President shall appoint at
least 1 member with demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising community banks having less than $10,000,000,000 in total
assets. 95

Aside from that, appointments are at the political branches’ discretion, but
the long terms and removal protection provide for at least some
independence during service. The President appoints, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the Chair of the Board and two Vice Chairs for four
years–but only out of the longer-termed board members. Members cannot
be reappointed after serving a full term (but can be appointed for fourteen
years if they came in to complete a term). 96
The structure of the Board of Governors is clearly constitutional. A
recent book called into question the constitutionality of the structure of
the Federal Open Market Committee (the Fed’s monetary policy
committee) because of the presence of the membership of Presidents of
several Federal Reserve Banks on it—but contrasted it with the (clear)
constitutionality of the appointment of Board Members. 97 In several cases,
the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain challenges to FOMC’s structure,
seeing it as a question internal to the legislature. 98 But we found no one
arguing that the structure of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve is unconstitutional, nor any valid legal challenges. In reality, the
structure is well within constitutional principles. The Board members are
appointed as principal officers under the appointment clause, and removal
93. 12 U.S.C. § 241.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 241.
96. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
97. C ONTI -B ROWN, supra note 89, at 112-15.
98. See Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 644 F. Supp. 510, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (summarizing that history).
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limits are not unusual in multi-member agencies. 99 For that matter, multimember boards with staggered terms are not unusual. 100 This structure led
to some, though not unlimited, independence of the Fed from both
Congress and the political executive. 101
Congress should structure CDC’s governance to have a sevenmember board with similar long–12 or 14–years staggered terms, with a
member replaced every two years, with board members only subject to
removal for cause (While the meaning of for-cause removal has never
been well-defined, and there is a risk of political firing under this rubric
as well, historical experience suggests it is, in fact, a meaningful
protection 102 ). Guidance for appointment should suggest drawing on
expertise in the different areas of prevention the CDC covers–prevention
of infectious diseases, non-infectious diseases, injuries and global health,
at a macro level. A number of positions on board can be statutorily
reserved for previous or sitting agency members. Modeled on the Banking
Act, the statute can state that “the President shall appoint at least 1
member with demonstrated experience in running one of the CDC centers
or units.”
A staggered, multi-members board with terms longer than the sitting
President would limit presidential control. Allowing the President to
appoint the Chairman of the board from among the governors will give a
sitting President direct, though limited, influence on the leadership of the
Board–and a two-years staggering will ensure that each President should
have a chance to appoint one or two directors.
These changes will increase CDC’s independence from politics, and
also send a symbolic message, a message that Congress expects our public
health guidance to be apolitical and science-based. It would not solve all
or even most of the problems facing us in pandemics, but it will assure the
existence of a body of experts with a defined role, a role that includes
speaking up. It would not prevent the White House from issuing its own
guidance–but it will be clear to observers that such guidance implies
political rejection of expertise (which may in itself be a deterrence), and

99. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 C AL. L. R EV.
1375, 1397 (2017).
100. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. R EV. 1111, 1112-14 (2000).
101. Richard Sylla, The Autonomy of Monetary Authorities: The Case of the United States
Federal Reserve System, ch. 2 in C ENTRAL B ANKS’ INDEPENDENCE IN HISTORICAL P ERSPECTIVE 17,
24-37 (Gianni Toniollo ed. 2012).
102. Richard Rothman & Katelin Shugart-Schmidt, Lying in Wait: How a Court Should Handle
the Pretextual For-Cause Removal, 86 GEO. W ASH. L. R EV. 1348, 1359-63 (2018).
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it will reduce the direct pressure the White House can impose on the
agency.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many changes we need to make to improve our pandemic
preparedness going forward. But a positive step can be providing the CDC
better defined institutional independence, as it acts as an important expert
agency that guides and supports efforts at preventing disease. Political
efforts to interfere in CDC’s independence directly hurt its legitimacy.
Without real, visible change, it will be hard for it to regain the public’s
trust. Both for real independence–and for protecting the CDC’s image–we
need to act.

